Y Narahari
Game theory and mechanism design - New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, [c2014] - 492 p - IISc Lecture Notes Series Vol. 4 .
1. Introduction and Overview
Non-Cooperative Game Theory:
2. Key Notions in Game Theory
3. Extensive Form Games
4. Strategic Form Games
5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria
6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
8. Utility Theory
9. Matrix Games
10. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
11. Computation of Nash Equilibria
12. Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
13. Bayesian Games
Mechanism Design:
14. Introduction to Mechanism Design
15. Implementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms
16. Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem
17. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
18. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms
19. Mechanism Design Space in Quasilinear Environment
20. Auctions
21. Optimal Mechanisms and Myerson Auction
22. Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions
23. Implementation in Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
24. Further Topics in Mechanism Design
Cooperative Game Theory:
25. Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium
26. The Two Person Bargaining Problem
27. Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility
28. The Core of Coalitional Games
29. The Shapley Value
30. Other Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory
31. Stable Matching
32. Epilogue
33. Mathematical Preliminaries
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience. --- summary provided by publisher
978-981-4525-05-3
Mathematics
QA269
Game theory and mechanism design - New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, [c2014] - 492 p - IISc Lecture Notes Series Vol. 4 .
1. Introduction and Overview
Non-Cooperative Game Theory:
2. Key Notions in Game Theory
3. Extensive Form Games
4. Strategic Form Games
5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria
6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
8. Utility Theory
9. Matrix Games
10. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
11. Computation of Nash Equilibria
12. Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
13. Bayesian Games
Mechanism Design:
14. Introduction to Mechanism Design
15. Implementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms
16. Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem
17. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
18. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms
19. Mechanism Design Space in Quasilinear Environment
20. Auctions
21. Optimal Mechanisms and Myerson Auction
22. Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions
23. Implementation in Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
24. Further Topics in Mechanism Design
Cooperative Game Theory:
25. Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium
26. The Two Person Bargaining Problem
27. Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility
28. The Core of Coalitional Games
29. The Shapley Value
30. Other Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory
31. Stable Matching
32. Epilogue
33. Mathematical Preliminaries
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience. --- summary provided by publisher
978-981-4525-05-3
Mathematics
QA269