000			03099nam a22002177a 4500
003			OSt
005			20241122123120.0
008			190514b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a978-981-4525-05-3
040			_cTata Book House _aICTS-TIFR
050			_aQA269
100			_aY Narahari
245			_aGame theory and mechanism design
260			_aNew Jersey: _bWorld Scientific Publishing, _c[c2014]
300			_a492 p
490			_aIISc Lecture Notes Series _vVol. 4
505			_a1. Introduction and Overview Non-Cooperative Game Theory: 2. Key Notions in Game Theory 3. Extensive Form Games 4. Strategic Form Games 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 8. Utility Theory 9. Matrix Games 10. Existence of Nash Equilibrium 11. Computation of Nash Equilibria 12. Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 13. Bayesian Games Mechanism Design: 14. Introduction to Mechanism Design 15. Implementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms 16. Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem 17. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem 18. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms 19. Mechanism Design Space in Quasilinear Environment 20. Auctions 21. Optimal Mechanisms and Myerson Auction 22. Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions 23. Implementation in Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium 24. Further Topics in Mechanism Design Cooperative Game Theory: 25. Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium 26. The Two Person Bargaining Problem 27. Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility 28. The Core of Coalitional Games 29. The Shapley Value 30. Other Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory 31. Stable Matching 32. Epilogue 33. Mathematical Preliminaries
520			_aThis book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience. --- summary provided by publisher
650			_aMathematics
942			_2lcc _cBK
999			_c2678 _d2678